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Political Theory, Political Science, and the
End of Civic Engagement
Ben Berger

Within a span of fifteen years civic engagement has become a cottage industry in political science and political theory, but the term
has now outlived its usefulness and exemplifies Giovanni Sartori’s worry about conceptual “stretching.” This article traces civic
engagement’s ascension as a catch-all term for almost anything that citizens might happen to do together or alone, and illustrates the
confusion that its popularity has occasioned. It proposes that civic engagement meet a well-deserved end, to be replaced with a more
nuanced and descriptive set of engagements: political, social, and moral. It also examines the appeal of engagement itself, a term that
entails both attention and energy. Attention and energy are the mainsprings of politics and most other challenging human endeavors. But they can be invested politically, or in associative pursuits, or in moral reasoning and follow-through, and those types of
engagement can, but need not, coincide. We should be asking which kinds of engagement—which kinds of attention and energetic
activity—make democracy work, and how they might be measured and promoted.

ivic engagement is ready for the dustbin. That
judgment might surprise the scholars, journalists,
educators, and community leaders for whom civic
engagement has become a household word. Since Robert
Putnam first popularized the term in his 1993 classic, Making DemocracyWork, it has spread through the pages of newspapers, internet sites, academic books and journals, and
mainstream political discourse.1 Politicians praise it;
foundations fund its study and implementation; educational institutions encourage their students to undertake
it. Nongovernmental institutions (NGOs) promote its
growth in developing democracies. But like other buzzwords, civic engagement means so many things to so many
people that it clarifies almost nothing. Thus I come to bury
civic engagement, not to praise it.
Scholars use “civic engagement” to describe activities
ranging from bowling in leagues to watching political television shows, writing checks to political advocacy groups,
and participating in political rallies and marches.2 For many
journalists, public officials, and political activists civic
engagement can mean everything from charitable giving

to associational membership, political participation, artistic expression, or community service.3 Some maintain that
civic engagement has declined in the United States and
other liberal democracies over the past 40 years. Others
disagree, contending that civic engagement has simply
changed its shapes and forms.4 We cannot easily judge
these disputes because their advocates consistently talk
past one another, using “civic engagement” to describe
entirely different things. The conflicting parties do agree
on one point: whatever civic engagement is, we need as
much as we can get. But they are confused about its meaning and wrong about its value.
This essay advocates the end of civic engagement. Not
the end of political participation, social connectedness,
associational membership, voluntarism, community spirit,
or cooperative and tolerant moral norms but rather the
umbrella term, civic engagement, used to encompass all of
those topics while clarifying none. Civic engagement as it
is currently used includes political, social, and moral components, or the entire “kitchen sink” of public and private
goods. It exemplifies Giovanni Sartori’s concern about “conceptual stretching,” or “the distortion that occurs when a
concept, applied to new cases, does not fit the new cases.” 5
The stakes go beyond mere semantics. Words frame our
debates, shape our research agendas, and affect the ways in
which we view the world. When our words yield “vague,
amorphous conceptualizations” rather than widely accessible concepts—concepts that mean something similar for
most people most of the time—we cannot easily study,
operationalize or discuss the social and political phenomena that surround us.6 Civic engagement thwarts easy study
or discussion; it fares poorly on most of the criteria that
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John Gerring proposes for evaluating conceptual “goodness,” including coherence, depth, and field utility.7 Sartori and Gerring provide all the rope needed to hang civic
engagement, which began its short life as an overly-elastic
concept and has only been stretched further over time. In
conversations about “making democracy work”—the subject of Putnam’s excellent landmark work and also this
essay’s overarching theme—civic engagement confuses more
than it illuminates, and hence it must go.
Only half of the term merits early retirement. We should
put civic to rest while coming to grips with engagement.
“Civic” simply means that a subject pertains to citizenship or a city, so it can easily be subsumed under the
rubric of “political” without any loss of conceptual clarity.8 In fact, clarity prevails when we stop stretching “civic”
to mean sociable, helpful, or trusting, as so often happens in civic engagement scholarship. But engagement
possesses untapped potential, and part of my purpose is
to tap it. Engagement is a uniquely appropriate term for
discussing how to make democracy work, but only if we
understand its full significance. At present we do not.
Literally, engagement entails a combination of attention
and energy (or activity), the two primary components of
political governance or any intensely interactive relationship.9 When we worry about declining engagement, which
we have done at increasing rates over the past 15 years,
we are actually worrying about the elusiveness of our
attention and energy—and well we might.10 Since the
era of ancient Greece, democracies have struggled to maintain these same resources. Attention involves selectively
focusing one’s wits on subjects that generate special interest or demand redress; activity involves following through
on the subjects attended to, investing energy in their
maintenance or resolution.11 Democracy’s citizens must
indeed be engaged, which is to say attentive and active.
But attentive to what? Active in which ways? That vague
rubric, “civic,” gives us little indication.
When sociologists laud “civic engagement” they commonly mean what I call social or moral engagement, people’s
attention and energies invested in social groups and networks or focused on moral reasoning and follow-through.
When political theorists and political scientists laud “civic
engagement” they often focus on what I call political
engagement, people’s attention to and activity in political
issues and processes. These are issues and processes that
necessitate interaction with the polity (the state) or any
level of government. But democracy may actually flourish
with only middling levels of political engagement if it is
rich in social and moral engagement. That possibility goes
against the belief, common among participatory democrats, that we need as much political attention and activity
as we can get. But rather than disparage political engagement, we should recognize the costs as well as the benefits
of promoting it and should remember that democracy
requires a variety of dispositions, values and behaviors.

We should be asking which kinds of engagement—political,
social, or moral—make democracy work, and how they
might be promoted. Civic engagement is dead; long live
political, social, and moral engagement.12
Some might doubt whether we can or should distinguish between political, social, and moral involvements.
Not only can we, but Hannah Arendt is right in asserting
that we ignore those distinctions at our peril. To Arendt,
politics comprises the space of human freedom and “the
social” must not infect its domain.13 Arendt’s “social”
denotes a realm of human life marked by necessity that
opposes freedom: bodily needs and desires, biological functions, love, pity, compassion, and ideologies or “race theories” based on biological essentialism.14 Her category of
the “social” thus includes economics, which must be barred
from consideration in the free political realm. Politics,
conversely, involves people coming together freely to strive
greatly, act boldly, and—in the shining light generated by
free individuals acting cooperatively—reveal their distinctiveness and find meaning in their lives. I demur from
Arendt’s idiosyncratic characterizations of the political and
the social but I agree with her overarching point: politics
loses all meaning if anything and everything can fall within
its purview.
Arendt also stresses the vital importance of judgment
and “thinking what we are doing,” traits and orientations
that resemble what I call “moral engagement.” 15 In the
absence of judgment—in the presence of “thoughtlessness” —people can condone or perform egregious actions,
with Adolf Eichmann representing the thoughtless individual par excellence. 16 Thoughtless individuals still possess cognition, of course, which Arendt describes as mere
“instrumental reason” divorced from courage, conviction,
or moral sense. She implies that in an era of scientific
breakthroughs and nuclear capabilities, unless citizens and
officials muster the moral resolution to “think what we are
doing”—unless we pay attention to, and act in accordance with, legitimate moral principles—we may end the
world with a bang, not a whimper.17
Alexis de Tocqueville, an earlier student of democratic
polities, also distinguishes social and moral from political
involvements, but with a more traditional understanding
of “the political.” Tocqueville defines political associations
as groups “by which men seek to defend themselves against
the despotic action of the majority or the encroachments
of . . . power.” He distinguishes these from social groups
or “civil associations,” groups in civil society “which have
no political object.” 18 To put Tocqueville’s insights in my
terms, not all social engagement is political. Tocqueville
further recognizes that neither political nor social or civil
associations will always promote moral virtues such as generalized tolerance or mutual respect; in other words, not
all political and social engagement involves meaningful
moral engagement. Political associations can actually
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Table 1
Criteria of conceptual goodness
Familiarity

How familiar is the concept (to a lay or academic audience)?

Resonance
Parsimony
Coherence
Differentiation

Does the chosen term ring (resonate)?
How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the intension)?
How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances and attributes?
How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from other most-similar concepts)?
How bounded, how operationalizable, is the concept?
How many accompanying properties are shared by the instances under definition?
How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences?
How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?

Depth
Theoretical Utility
Field Utility

Source: Gerring 1999, 367.

To grasp civic engagement’s grave shortcomings, consider John Gerring’s eight criteria for evaluating conceptual “goodness” (refer to table 1). Gerring’s standards bolster
the case that common sense initiates: civic engagement
lacks conceptual coherence, parsimony, depth, differentiation and utility.
Civic engagement evinces familiarity and resonance, the
first two of Gerring’s criteria. But the concept lacks parsimony; its list of defining attributes exhausts memory and
patience. It also lacks coherence. What thread could coherently link bowling in leagues, voting alone, writing checks
to political candidates or interest groups, attending dinner parties, creating politically conscious artwork, volunteering at soup kitchens, attending church and watching
politically relevant television programs, all of which have
been counted as forms of civic engagement?
Nor is civic engagement differentiated or easily operationalizable. One would be hard pressed to distinguish its
attributes from those of similar concepts such as social
networking and “social capital,” political participation, civic
virtue, and even friendship. Operationalizing civic engagement becomes as difficult as operationalizing any “kitchen
sink” concept, because it means measuring a vast array of
phenomena and attributes. Civic engagement fares just as
poorly on the criterion of conceptual depth. Only surface
similarities link the instances grouped under its umbrella.
Some phenomena labeled “civic engagement” involve attention but little activity; some involve activity but little attention; some involve a political component while lacking a
social component; others involve a social component while
lacking a political component; and some involve a strong,
liberal-democratic moral component while others do not.24
Civic engagement also disappoints in the area of theoretical utility. The modifier “civic” has such broad connotations that no one is quite sure what it means. It allows
anyone who invokes it to evoke something of special interest to that party—social connectedness, political participation, sociable norms, and so on. Finally, for some of the
same reasons that civic engagement lacks conceptual depth
it also lacks field utility for those within political science

encourage moral disengagement because, as Tocqueville
witnessed in France, “by the single act of uniting” citizens
can make “a complete sacrifice of their judgment and free
will,” which “greatly diminishes their moral strength.” 19
My purpose in distinguishing between political, social,
and moral engagement is not to stake out an essentialist
claim about the “nature” of this or that attentive activity.
One trend in contemporary political theory has moved in
the opposite direction, as scholars have challenged traditional boundaries between political and unpolitical in order
to expand the former significantly. Feminist theorists such
as Carol Pateman insist on “making the personal political”
because traditional public/private distinctions have rendered certain issues, of great importance for social justice,
ineligible for political intervention or reform.20 Vaclav
Havel suggests that apparently private decisions and actions
can connect with and influence political outcomes.21 I do
not contest those claims. The personal or private can indeed
be political, if and when citizens seek to express personal
decisions or influence previously “private” issues through
the polity’s organs: political processes and institutions. Until
then, their pursuits are either unpolitical or pre-political.22
They might be of intense interest to political scientists
and political theorists, but we should not conflate them
with attentive activity that directly engages political processes and institutions if we care about establishing a coherent, far-reaching dialogue across academic disciplines.
I propose such distinctions to help us think and talk
more clearly about “making democracy work.” Conceptual clarity and agreement affect our ability to diagnose
problems and prescribe solutions cooperatively. What kinds
of orientations, activities, and relationships should friends
of democracy be concerned to promote? When we cannot
distinguish between political and apolitical (or prepolitical) engagements—and when we cannot even be certain what “engagement” entails—we build an academic
Tower of Babel one essay at a time.23 Civic engagement
has become just such a tower, with countless scholars at
work on its scaffolding sans mutual appreciation or
cooperation.
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and sociology who address pressing questions about making democracy work. Some use civic engagement to measure political activity, some to measure social connectedness,
and some to gauge citizens’ commitment to their communities. The result is that rather than giving these scholars a
common vocabulary, civic engagement leaves them talking past each other.25
While “civic engagement” fares poorly with all but two
of Gerring’s criteria—familiarity and resonance—my proposed replacements of political, social, and moral engagement satisfy far more of the same criteria without ceding
ground on the criterion of resonance. Civic engagement
“rings” or resonates with contemporary sensibilities, but
my proposed replacements do not sound alien. Civic
engagement retains only one advantage over its political,
social, and moral cousins: greater familiarity, stemming
from its media saturation. But by the end of this article its
familiarity may breed contempt.
Some concepts achieve familiarity through longstanding use. Not so with civic engagement, which originated
quite recently. Civic engagement struck a chord from the
outset, and its resonance among scholars and ordinary
citizens accounts for part of its meteoric rise to prominence and familiarity. But part of the term’s appeal lay in
its ambiguity. From its inception, civic engagement meant
different things in different situations, and its early elasticity invited a slew of further stretching. Unlike terms
and concepts whose origins are shrouded in the distant
past, civic engagement is of such recent birth that we can
glimpse some of the factors, present from the beginning,
that invited both widespread use and confusion.26
Prior to 1993 civic engagement appeared only rarely in
scholarly discourse, and almost never in American political discourse or popular media.27 On rare occasions it was
used in a manner totally unlike its current usages, with
civic adhering to its dictionary definition, “of or pertaining to the city,” and engagement denoting an appointment
or meeting. Accordingly, one Australian writer praised his
city’s conscientious mayor for spending her birthday amid
city hall meetings, “with her first civic engagement at
10 a.m.” 28 An American university chancellor reminisced
about her tenure, in which she was “privileged to find
rewarding professional responsibilities, fulfilling civic
engagements, and numerous kindred spirits.” 29 But apart
from those occasional usages, civic engagement played no
significant role in public discourse about democracy’s
health.
One landmark book changed the rhetorical landscape.
Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993) emphasized “civic engagement” and “social capital” in comparing northern Italy’s economic and political successes with
southern Italy’s relative shortcomings. In that study, “civic”
acquired an extraordinary breadth, encompassing social
connectedness, sociability, and interpersonal trust, as well
as issues relating to politics and citizenship. Engagement

came to mean involvement of any kind, whether passive
(paying attention to social and political affairs) or more
active (investing energy in social or political affairs). Putnam found that northern Italy’s rich “civic engagement”—
its citizens’ participation in voluntary associations, diverse
friendship circles, and formal political processes—
corresponded with much higher levels of trust and reciprocal norms, and far greater political and economic
efficiency, than in the “civically disengaged” regions to
the south. Northern Italy’s vibrant array of social and
political groups contributed toward what Putnam called
a “civic community.” Southern Italy’s relative dearth of
associational life contributed to an “uncivic” community,
rife with political corruption, economic stagnation, and
“feelings of exploitation, dependency, and frustration.” 30
In other words, high civic engagement accompanied desirable political, economic, and moral results; low civic
engagement accompanied the opposite. Scholars began
to take note, and civic engagement entered their discourse and research.31
But while Putnam’s analysis set the agenda for an entire
new field of useful research in political and social science,
it accidentally gave rise to a seminal confusion by conflating “civic engagement” and “social capital.” In Making
Democracy Work “social capital” means “features of social
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” 32 What kinds of “norms and networks”
did Putnam have in mind? Norms and networks of civic
engagement, which, in turn comprised “an essential form
of social capital.33 To be fair, Putnam probably intended
“civic engagement” not as a form but as a source of social
capital. According to his analysis “civic engagement” meant
those associative involvements—whether political or not—
that enmesh individuals in “networks and norms” of trust
and reciprocity and hence generate social capital.34 Thus,
in Making Democracy Work, Putnam’s “civic engagement”
encompassed participation in mass political parties as well
as neighborhood associations, choral societies, sports clubs,
guilds, unions, and literary societies.35 It also involved a
moral component—norms of trust and reciprocity—
along with its political and social elements.36
Two years after publishing his Italian study, Putnam
introduced civic engagement to a broader audience by
focusing on twentieth-century U.S. history. In a series of
influential articles he argued that Americans’ civic engagement, now defined as “involvement with the lives of our
communities,” had steadily declined over several decades’
time. Civic engagement continued to encompass political
participation, associational memberships, informal socializing, citizens’ trust in government, and interpersonal trust,
and Putnam found all five to be trending sharply downward.37 His data seemed to affirm many citizens’ generalized complaint or “gut feeling” that America’s social and
political life were not what they had once been.38 And

338 Perspectives on Politics

䡬

|

|
䡬

since in Putnam’s Italian study low civic engagement correlated with very poor economic and political outcomes,
his findings in the U.S. seemed cause for alarm. In short
order civic engagement became a cause célèbre.
Soon, federally-funded research initiatives began measuring the “Nation’s Index of Civic Engagement,” as well
as “How Civic Disengagement Weakens America and What
We Can Do About It.” 39 NGOs won grants to promote
civic engagement in emerging democracies.40 In the academic world, Harvard’s Theda Skocpol formed an interdisciplinary “Civic Engagement Project” to study American
political development. High school and college educators
augmented traditional classroom offerings with “civic
engagement” internships and created campus centers to
encourage students’ extracurricular civic engagement. At
University of California–Los Angeles, civic engagement
became an academic subject in its own right, a concentration in which students could minor.41
The term caught on outside of the policy and academic
communities, as well. In 1995 the national weekly People
Magazine devoted a three-page spread to Putnam’s civic
engagement thesis, remarkable coverage for a scholarly
project.42 Writers in regional and national newspapers
increasingly discussed the apparent spread of “civic disengagement” and potential solutions, such as a hip-hop artist’s
“message of civic engagement” for urban youth.43 By the
time Putnam published his 2000 book Bowling Alone,
which summarized and expanded upon his earlier findings, regional and national newspapers were regularly
chronicling perceived trends of civic disengagement and
urging citizens and officials to stem the tide.
Not everyone agreed with Putnam’s U.S. assessment.
But even the dissenting voices generally disagreed only on
the question of civic engagement’s alleged decline rather
than on its meaning or value. Some critics maintained that
civic engagement still thrived but had changed shapes and
locations.44 According to their line of thought, involvement with Little League Baseball might have shrunk but
youth soccer leagues had taken its place. Nationally networked Parent Teacher Organizations (PTAs) might have
diminished, but independent Parent Teacher Organizations (PTOs) had filled the void. And while venerable,
fraternal and sororal organizations such as the Elks, Rotary
and DAR might have lost many members, small “selfhelp” groups provided outlets for those who sought to
connect and engage civically—although no one thought
to specify what that meant.45
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate civic engagement’s remarkably rapid ascension from obscurity to commonplace topic
in scholarly articles and U.S. newspapers. In each medium,
civic engagement began attracting notice around or after
1993, the year of Putnam’s first book on the subject.
Why did civic engagement catch on so quickly and widely
in the late twentieth century? Its subject matter was certainly nothing new. Following the eighteenth and nine-

Figure 1
Civic engagement in peer-reviewed articles
(full-text)

Source: ProQuest.

Figure 2
Civic engagement in U.S. newspapers
(full-text)
䡬

Source: Lexis-Nexis Academic.

teenth centuries’ industrial revolutions, theorists such as
Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, and Tönnies worried about
the dispersal of rooted agrarians into masses of urban laborers. They lamented a perceived decline in social connectedness, traditional values, and political solidarity. Other
intellectuals expressed similar worries amid the early twentieth century’s social and economic upheavals, which
included the growth of vast cities, the vicissitudes of economic depression and the travail of world wars. Yet none
of the words coined to discuss those concerns—isolation,
atomization, alienation, and anomie, for example—captured
the popular and scholarly imaginations as broadly or quickly
June 2009 | Vol. 7/No. 2 339
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as civic engagement and disengagement, which are used in
ways that encompass all of the others.46 In Gerring’s terms,
civic engagement resonated with scholars and with the general public, and its deep resonance led to widespread familiarity. But its resonance and familiarity, in the absence of
conceptual parsimony and differentiation, encouraged so
many people to adopt civic engagement for such a wide range
of purposes that it soon lost conceptual coherence. Yet the
term’s widespread use increased its familiarity, which encouraged further usage and watered down conceptual coherence all the more.
One likely reason for the term’s easy resonance resides
in the word “civic” itself. Literally, civic means “of, pertaining, or proper to citizens,” or to “citizenship, ” or to “a
city, borough, or municipality.” But it has come to connote a variety of other subjects as well, almost all of them
having positive associations: sociability, public spiritedness, and cooperative norms, for example.47 And while
few people agree on the word’s exact meaning, most seem
to agree about what “civic” opposes: narrow individualism,
isolationism, or an exclusive focus on oneself or one’s intimates. (Note that I am not referring to the antonyms of
civic, which might be something like rural or alien, but to
the concepts excluded or opposed by civic’s connotations.) The word’s combination of benevolence and ambiguity contributed to civic engagement’s broad appeal yet
also contributed to our current confusion.
But “engagement” has played a role as well. Even without the “civic” modifier, engagement has become a buzzword in its own right. Engagement connotes intensive
interaction, which almost everyone wants to promote in
some capacity—witness the recently coined terms “community engagement,” “psychological engagement,” “academic engagement,” “consumer engagement,” “corporate
engagement,” and even “digital engagement.” More specifically, engagement connotes activity and attention, an
investment of energy and a consciousness of purpose.
But because we can use engagement in three related but
different senses, the term invites its own kind of conceptual stretching. That stretching has contributed to civic
engagement’s distortion but need not hinder future studies of political, social, and moral engagement if scholars
and citizens pay attention to the distinct senses and their
appropriate uses.
“Engage,” used as a transitive verb, conveys an impression of interactivity, entanglement, and commitment of
resources (with energy and attention the resources most
often in play). In common parlance, one can engage in an
activity, engage with a subject, or be engaged by a subject.
“Engaging in” encompasses any kind of participation in
any kind of activity, but not necessarily attentive activity.
Engaging in an activity can mean rote repetition or perfunctory performance; one can engage in paper-pushing,
ditch-digging, or idle gossip. Conversely, the passive sense
of “engaged by” implies attention or interest without accom-

Table 2
Senses of engage
Sense of Engage
Engage in
Engaged by
Engage with

Involves
Activity

Involves
Attention?

Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

panying activity.48 One can be engaged by a painting, a
television show, or a charismatic speaker. “Engaged by” is
the verb form for spectators. Finally, “engaging with” tells
us not only that an activity is being undertaken but undertaken attentively, as one engages with an interlocutor, a
team member, or an intellectual or moral dilemma.
In summary, and as illustrated in table 2 above, the
sense of engage in implies attention without activity, the
sense of engaged by implies attention without activity, and
the sense of engage with implies activity as well as attention.
Too often, writers contemplating civic (or other forms
of ) engagement invoke these three senses interchangeably.49 Scholars who consider politicized television viewing as a form of civic or political engagement are drawing
upon the passive sense of being engaged by a subject.50 Television programs with political content might draw viewers’
attention to political affairs, but watching television entails
little if any political activity.51 Conversely, those scholars
who count political donations as a measure of civic or political engagement draw upon the sense of “engage in.” Donating money via check or online payment involves a brief
investment of the donor’s energy and very little attention to
political affairs.52 In fact, contributions to advocacy groups
are generally a delegation of attention, payment to a third
party who will attend to one’s concerns.53 Finally, holding
or running for office, attending town hall meetings, or participating in political rallies represent political engagement
in the sense of “engaging with” political affairs, a combination of political attention and activity.
Thus, scholars who use engagement to denote a particular activity to be counted or measured often underspecify what it comprises: is it attention alone, activity
alone, or both activity and attention? Hence they risk
talking past one another, as one person claims that political engagement (meaning passive attention) is up while
another claims that political engagement (meaning active
participation) is down. But that apparent difficulty could
be overcome if we simply recognize that attention and
activity undergird all of our concerns with engagement,
and take pains to indicate which resources are at stake in a
given instance of political engagement. Scholars could still
refer to television watching as a form of political engagement, but should also specify which of the two essential

340 Perspectives on Politics

䡬

|

|
䡬

Luther King, Jr. summarizes the distinction between passive attention and engaged citizenship as manifested in
the civil rights movement: “When legal contests were the
sole form of activity, the ordinary Negro was involved as a
passive spectator. His interest was stirred, but his energies
were unemployed. Mass marches transformed the common man into the star performer. . .” 59 Were political
engagement as a general condition to comprise only passive attention to political affairs, unaccompanied by political activity, many of democracy’s most cherished goals
would go unfulfilled. Political spectatorship by itself has
no obvious connection to the goals of legitimacy, fair representation, and citizen vigilance against governmental or
factional abuses. Attention and activity both matter when
we speak and write about the condition of engagement.
Indeed, when we focus our attention on attention and
activity, we can ensure that our studies of politically, socially,
or morally engaged populations actually measure the relevant characteristics.

resources, attention and activity, are at play. The goal would
be for professors and practitioners to recognize the resources
that underlie the buzz word “engagement” and to orient
their studies toward measuring activity and attention.
But engagement can be stretched conceptually for
another reason as well. Engagement can refer to a particular action or to a generalized condition, 54 yet scholars
seldom specify which sense they intend (and sometimes
oscillate between them). When describing a particular episode or action, engagement can mean activity alone, attention alone, or a combination of the two. But as a generalized
condition engagement always means a combination of
activity and attention. In other words, engagement as a
particular action can utilize the senses of engage in, engaged
by, and engage with, but engagement as a general condition only utilizes the sense of engage with. 55 A politically
engaged populace must be attentive to and active in political affairs, processes, and institutions. No one would call
a citizenry politically engaged—meaning a generalized condition of political engagement—if citizens only paid attention to political affairs, processes, and policies but never
took action to influence matters or raise their voices in
support or protest. The same objection holds for a citizenry in which people participate perfunctorily, voting
out of obligation, habit, or fear, yet pay no attention to
political affairs and processes and hence have no idea of
what their activities mean or express. Activity without attention is something like rote activity or “going through the
motions.” A bored schoolchild grudgingly completing an
assignment may be academically active but is certainly not
engaged with her studies.56 In political life, activity without attention might describe the perfunctory voting of a
nineteenth-century Tammany Hall supporter, who casts a
ballot for the prescribed city candidate in return for a
Christmas ham. It also might describe Benjamin Rush’s
vain exhortation that nineteenth-century America mold
its citizens into “republican machines” or “unquestioning
paragons of cooperation and self-sacrifice.” 57 The perfunctory voter and the “republican machine” are both politically engaged in a manner of speaking, investing energy in
political activities. But we would worry if everyone undertook political activities perfunctorily, acting from force of
habit without thinking for themselves. Perfunctory participation has no obvious connection to those political
capacities involving critical judgment.
Passive attention and judgment have limits of their own.
To be sure, widespread attention to political affairs without accompanying political activity might advance the goal
of democratic legitimacy, if one were to construe the viewers’ silence as tacit consent. But passive viewers, even if
they engage in internal debate, remain on the outside. As
if in agreement, the National Commission on Civic
Renewal calls its final report on civic disengagement “A
Nation of Spectators,” and Rick Valelly characterizes Putnam’s America as “Couch Potato Democracy.” 58 Martin

Political Engagement
As should be apparent by now, political engagement refers
to attentive activity directly involving the polity—whether
at the local, state, or national level—or any “activity that
is intended to or has the consequences of affecting, either
directly or indirectly, government action.” 60 Thus, political engagement encompasses most of the activities that
we normally associate with political participation or citizenship: voting, contacting representatives, contributing
financially to representatives or interest groups, following
political issues (via any media format), associating with
groups intended to influence political outcomes, attending rallies or demonstrations intended to influence political outcomes, or running for (or holding) political office.
Political engagement as a particular episode could involve
only political attention, only political activity, or both of
them together, but political engagement as a generalized
state must represent attention to political affairs and processes as well as activity aimed at actualization.
Political engagement subsumes civic engagement, because
if “civic” is construed as “relating to the city,” then the polity subsumes the city. And if “civic” is construed as “relating
to citizenship,” then “the political” encompasses issues relating to citizenship as well.61 While political engagement subsumes civic engagement, it differs from social engagement;
political actions and involvements do not always require multiple parties. Many regard solitary voting as the paradigmatic political act.62 Not only voting but donating to
political candidates or causes, writing letters or e-mails to
elected officials or op-ed pages, and following politics via
mass media: all of these activities can be undertaken by oneself.63 Even Aristotle, widely cited by civic republican enthusiasts, does not hold politics to be intrinsically social. In the
Politics he describes kingship as a “true” form of political
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rule, yet the ruling activity of one virtuous individual does
not involve collective, political deliberation.64
Political engagement encompasses all of the attentive
activities that citizens’ duties require, without the difficulties that “civic engagement” encounters. Consider the case
of political activism undertaken by non-citizens. On May 1
of 2006, thousands of Mexican workers staged El Gran
Paro Estadounidense, the Great American Strike or Boycott, hoping to shape American immigration policy. How
could we call their efforts “civic engagement” when many
of them were not citizens in the first place? Nor were they
attempting simply to influence their local city, but rather
to capture national attention and influence national policy. If we switch political with civic engagement we lose
the conceptual problems altogether, because citizens and
non-citizens alike can try to influence political processes
and outcomes.

Social Engagement

䡬

Social engagement encompasses all manner of associationalinvolvements.ItmeansattentiveactivityinwhatTocqueville calls “those associations in civil life which have no
political object,” as well as informal socializing and personal friendships.65 Thus social engagement is conceptually distinct from political engagement, although as discussed
above the two can be combined. But social engagement
occurs more commonly without a political component; most
of our everyday social engagements are unpolitical. Repeated
social engagement may produce what Putnam and others
call “social capital,” or relationships of trust and reciprocity, and social capital tends to correlate with political engagement.66 Thus while social engagement may not be political
in itself, it certainly can be pre-political; it can be a resource
that fosters or facilitates political engagement.67
Tocqueville’s Old Regime and the Revolution provides a
cogent distinction between the political engagement of
citizens and the social engagement of associational members. Tocqueville contrasts the voluntary associations predominant in sixteenth-century with those found in
eighteenth-century France, and finds that only the earlier
era’s groups evinced political orientations. Associational
members in the sixteenth century, “after having taken
care of the business of their own associations among
themselves, constantly met with all the other inhabitants
to deliberate together about the general interests of the
city.” But by the eighteenth century, members of French
voluntary associations “had almost entirely withdrawn
into themselves, for the acts of municipal life had become
rare, and were always executed by individuals.” 68 Any
coincidence between social and political engagement was
circumstantial rather than logically necessary.
In Democracy in America Tocqueville worries about the
tendency for democracy to foster individualism, a selfabsorbed withdrawal from public concerns and political

engagement. But in the Old Regime he finds “no individuals who did not belong to a group and who could consider themselves absolutely alone,” yet nonetheless “each
one of the thousand little groups of which French society
was composed thought only of itself ” and of “matters
which directly affected it.” Thus, eighteenth-century France
was rife with social engagement but also with what Tocqueville calls “collective individualism,” and a notable absence
of political attention or cooperation.
Sheri Berman describes a similar phenomenon in
Weimar Germany, where a flourishing civil society worked
at cross-purposes with public-spirited political citizenship. As with Tocqueville’s France and its “thousand little
groups,” Weimar Germany’s many voluntary associations
“served to hive their memberships off from each other and
contribute to the formation of what one observer called
‘ferociously jealous small republics.’” 69 Berman, likeTocqueville, describes pernicious effects that may ensue when
widespread social engagement is divorced from statesanctioned political processes and institutions: “Germans
threw themselves into their clubs, voluntary associations,
and professional organizations out of frustration with the
failures of the national government and political parties,
thereby helping to undermine the Weimar Republic and
facilitate Hitler’s rise to power.” 70
Only when we distinguish between political and social
engagements rather than compressing them under a single
“civic engagement” banner can we draw helpful lessons
from the French and German experiences. Those records
suggest that widespread social engagement combined with
radical political disengagement—in other words, the generation of “social capital” among people who either cannot or will not translate their energies into political voice
and action—can imperil democratic stability. Further, neither social nor political engagement is itself sufficient for
political stability; democracies require responsive political
institutions through which citizen engagement can be channeled, lest pent-up demand for redress explode into violence or chaos.

Moral Engagement
The category of moral engagement waits in the wings,
involved with some but not all political and social engagement. Moral engagement encompasses attention to, and
activity in support of, a particular moral code, moral reasoning, or moral principles. This category is the most subtle and difficult to define, but represents a crucial distinction
nonetheless. We should first note that, like social and moral
engagement, moral engagement can represent either a particular episode or a general condition. As the former, moral
engagement can mean either attention to a moral code or
activity relating to a moral code or both. As the latter,
moral engagement means a combination of attention, and
activity relating to, moral codes or moral reasoning. At
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injustice because he engages with faulty principles.75
Extremists of many backgrounds have practiced religious,
racial or ethnic oppression while motivated by, and closely
attentive to, a set of moral dictates—illiberal moral dictates, but moral dictates nonetheless.76 Thus, we might
claim that stable liberal democracies require a certain kind
of moral engagement from its citizens, involving attention
and activity relating to moral principles such as toleration,
reciprocity and law-abidingness. The exact content of democratic moral engagement is a matter for extensive debate
that lies outside this article’s scope.77 And while democracy might require a certain kind of moral engagement, it
also requires responsible institutions to rectify those
instances in which even democratic moral engagement
produces undemocratic and illiberal outcomes.
Because widespread democratic moral engagement is
more of an aspiration than an imminent reality, and also
because even liberal-democratic moral engagement is subject to misapplication, liberal democracies require stable
and responsive political institutions and an established
rule of law not only to encourage moral engagement among
the citizenry and representatives, but to prevent the damaging consequences that could result from misguided,
oppressive, and pernicious moral engagement.
Most important, moral engagement does not equal
political or social engagement, because not all moral engagement has a political or social component. Moral engagement certainly can accompany social or political
engagement; religious communities and close friendships
combine attention and activity relating to social dynamics
and moral principles, and civil rights marches bring together
political, social, and moral elements. But often they part
company. Jewish tradition values the practice of anonymous charity, in which neither the recipient nor the benefactor knows the other’s identity.78 Tocqueville’s Memoir
on Pauperism provides a further example. Tocqueville distinguishes between “two kinds of welfare,” one of which is
“produced and regulated by society,” conceived and administered by people in their collective capacity, involving
moral and social engagement. But the second kind of welfare “is a private virtue” that “escapes social action” and
“leads each individual, according to his means, to alleviate
the evils he sees around him.” In other words, the second
kind of welfare involves moral engagement without social
or political aspects.79
When Nancy Rosenblum criticizes “liberal expectancy,” she means to chide those who assume (without
basis) that social engagement will always produce desirable moral engagement.80 History provides many examples of politically or socially engaged individuals tragically
lacking in moral engagement, from Ku Klux Klan members to Adolf Eichmann (Nazi Germany’s model citizen
but Hannah Arendt’s primary example of one who did
not “think what he was doing”).81 To conflate political or
social engagement with moral engagement is to ascribe

the societal level, scholars will care about the widespread
condition of moral engagement, but that might be gauged
by measuring many different instances of episodic moral
engagement (whether attention, activity, or both).
As a general condition, moral engagement involves not
only an orientation or state of character but also moral
activity or follow-through. A morally engaged individual
possesses a disposition to act on his or her moral principles; she possesses virtues of character in addition to any
intellectual virtues. As Aristotle writes of moral actions,
moral engagement involves doing the right thing while
being committed to the reasons that justify for the action.
But for actions expressing virtue to be done temperately or justly
[and hence well] it does not suffice that they are themselves in
the right state. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state
when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on
them for themselves; and third, he must also do them from a
firm and unchanging state.71

In Aristotle’s account, incontinent individuals lack virtue
because they either fail to perform moral actions or they
“go through the motions” without cognizance of the moral
justification. In my terms, they either lack moral activity or
moral attention. Even if one acts rightly, “saying the words
that come from knowledge is no sign [of fully having it] . . .
Hence we must suppose that incontinents say the [moral]
words in the way that actors do . . . [merely] saying the words,
as the drunk says the words of Empedocles.” 72
To restate, moral engagement as a condition means more
than simply going through the moral motions. Friends of
liberal democracy cannot relish the prospect of a citizenry
habitually undertaking morally laudable activities without any attention to the underlying moral justification or
rationale. In the absence of moral reasoning, nothing guarantees that citizens’ future actions will be morally desirable. Such citizens would be morally docile, in George
Kateb’s terms, available for mobilization into any activity
without the intermediary of moral judgment regarding its
ultimate worth.73 On the other hand, attention to moral
principles without acting to actualize them would be a
kind of moral spectatorship, a refusal to act on one’s own
moral dictates. In his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”
Martin Luther King, Jr. condemns precisely this kind of
moral passivity: “We will have to repent in this generation
not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad
people but for the appalling silence of the good people.” 74
Of course, even moral engagement conceptualized as
attention and activity does not ensure morally desirable
outcomes. Even the best intentions, and morally defensible reasoning and actions, can lead to unintended consequences. And if moral engagement with defensible moral
codes can end badly, all the more so for moral engagement
with indefensible moral codes. In Aristotle’s Politics the
good citizen in an unjust regime undertakes activities morally sanctioned by his fellows yet nonetheless commits

June 2009 | Vol. 7/No. 2 343

䡬

䡬

|

|
䡬

Articles

䡬

|

Political Theory, Political Science, and the End of Civic Engagement

more to political and social involvement than they can
sustain, conceptually or historically.82
Of course, all social engagement includes at least a modicum of moral engagement among associates. League
bowlers must subscribe to minimal, shared norms of behavior among each other. But subscribing to relevant norms
of group behavior comprises a very thin kind of morality
indeed, not just a quantitative but a qualitative difference
from moral engagement as I have described it. In addition
to being thin, the minimal moral engagement among some
group members can also be narrow: it can extend no further than the relevant group, and thus can be of questionable utility for democratic politics. Putnam captures this
nuance by distinguishing between “bridging (or inclusive)
and bonding (or exclusive)” social capital.83 The former
denotes “networks [that] are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages,” and can promote tolerant norms toward a broad range of people. The
latter denotes associations or networks that “are, by choice
or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups”; these are useful
“for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity.” He means that social engagement does not always
entail generalizable moral engagement, precisely the point
that Plato taught two thousand years earlier when he
reminded us that even pirates or thieves require a modicum of justice among themselves, although they do not
extend their code to ill-fated outsiders.84

Civil Engagement
For the sake of conceptual clarity we must identify instances
in which political, social, and moral engagements occur
independently, but in practice they often coincide. One
combination merits a separate discussion and perhaps its
own category: the social-moral engagement of publicspirited, cooperative problem-solving, which I propose to
call “civil engagement.” Not only does that term resonate
with the commonplace concept of “civil society”—the
cooperative space between governmental and purely private affairs—but it meshes with Alexis de Tocqueville’s
typology. Tocqueville uses “civil” to describe associations
that, while not concerned with political processes or institutions, pursue their members’ common ends cooperatively. He maintains that only citizen action, rather than
political force, can “[refresh] the circulation of feelings
and ideas among a great people.” Tocqueville’s Americans
engage civilly when they “have conceived a sentiment or
an idea that they want to produce before the world,” such
as the “one hundred thousand men [who] had publicly
promised never to drink alcoholic liquor” in an effort to
influence their fellow citizens by collective example rather
than governmental coercion.85 J. G. A. Pocock supports
this distinction between “civil,” meaning social-moral, and
civic or political engagement. Pocock depicts eighteenth-

century Edinburgh as experiencing a “proliferation of Spectatorial clubs and societies, practicing the virtues of polite
conversation and enlightened taste while discussing the
economic, cultural and even . . . the moral improvement
of Scottish life,” which represented a change from the
more explicitly political engagement of an earlier era. In
Pocock’s terms, “the locus of virtue shifted decisively from
the political and military to that blend of the economic,
cultural and moral”; in other words, the locus of virtue
shifted “from the civic to the civil.” 86
“Civil engagement” as I have conceptualized it represents the kind of social-moral engagement that Tocqueville and many contemporary scholars feel to be particularly
important for democracies’ flourishing. It possesses familiarity and resonance because of its association with the
vast “civil society” literature, and it lacks the pitfalls that
have accompanied previous attempts to distinguish cooperative voluntarism from political engagement.87 As an
example of such pitfalls, Zukin et al. call cooperative voluntarism “civic engagement” and political involvement
“political engagement,” but their terminology invites as
much confusion as it resolves.88 In addition to the linguistic confusion involved with contrasting civic and political
when the two terms overlap so enticingly, Zukin’s “civic
engagement” includes any kind of associational membership or social engagement in addition to explicitly moral,
community-oriented involvements. In other words, it
includes involvement in bowling leagues as well as in soup
kitchens. Thus the authors inadvertently re-constitute Putnam’s original difficulty of conflating concepts. At one
pole, their “civic engagement” may confuse scholars and
citizens because we so commonly associate “civic” with
“political.” At the other pole, their “civic engagement”
blends indistinguishably into the social. “Civil engagement” lacks these problems and helps us to think more
clearly about making democracy work.

Conclusion
Replacing civic engagement with political, social, and moral
varieties (and augmenting them with civil engagement as
well) helps us to think and talk more clearly about making
democracy work. At present, many scholars associate high
“civic engagement” with a range of desirable outcomes, often
implying that the former somehow promotes the latter, but
they wrongly give the same credit to political attention and
activity as to social and moral engagement.89 Virtually all of
the available research suggests a positive correlation between
social capital—which encompasses what I have called social
and also moral engagement—and economic and governmental efficiency, high-performing schools, life satisfaction, and even life expectancy.90 Political engagement as I
have defined it—attention to and activity in political processes and affairs—bears no necessary connection to any of
those phenomena. Italy, Indonesia, and South Africa all
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evince much higher levels of political interest and turnout
than the United States, but much lower levels of social capital and social (and civil) engagement—and they rank lower
in measures of economic and governmental efficiency, life
satisfaction, public health, and other features allegedly correlated with so-called “civic engagement.” 91 Political attention and activity often correlate with social capital and what
I have called social and civil engagement, but when they
diverge—when societies feature either high social capital or
high levels of political attention and activity, but not both—
those democracies with high levels of social engagement and
social capital almost always fare better in the relevant measures of efficiency, satisfaction, public health, and perceived legitimacy.
Political engagement still has many things to recommend it, and democracy would not be democracy unless
citizens invested at least some attention and activity to
politics. Further, the worthy ideals of political legitimacy
and fair representation would be much better served by
higher political participation and turnout among groups
that traditionally have been less active and vocal.92 But
promoting political engagement will require money, time,
and other scarce resources. And because many people freely
choose political disengagement,93 promoting widespread
change might also require legal coercion, which liberal
democracies cannot undertake lightly.94
Thus, anyone advocating very high political engagement for all citizens must explain not only what it is but
why liberal democracies must have it in spades. This article
has addressed the first question; we should understand political engagement as a combination of attention to and activity in political affairs—affairs which require or demand
interaction with political organs or institutions—which can
(but need not) be combined with social or moral engagement. It remains to inquire into the relative values of these
kinds of attentive activity. Is political engagement intrinsically valuable for human beings, constitutive of human flourishing, as certain civic republican theorists state or imply? 95
Is it instrumentally valuable for citizens of democracy, conducive to a range of goals such as stability, fairness, political
legitimacy, and efficiency, as some political scientists have
suggested? Must citizens be politically engaged all the
time or only episodically? Perhaps liberal democracies can
flourish with relatively low levels of political engagement
if they also feature continuously high social and moral
engagement—which can be channeled into political engagement should the circumstances warrant—and political institutions able to process that episodic engagement and respond
satisfactorily. Perhaps liberal democracies do require high
and widespread political engagement for the sake of fair representation and political legitimacy. These are questions for
further research. But we cannot began to answer them if we
do not know how to pose them clearly. Clarity issues a simple demand: that civic give way to political, social and moral
engagement.
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Aristotle 1984, 1276b30.
Thoroughgoing moral disengagement probably
occurs but rarely, as in the case of sociopaths who do
not attend to any moral code whatsoever. Less extreme but still dangerous versions include what
Arendt calls “thoughtlessness,” or a refusal to “think
what we are doing.” Arendt 1959, 5 and 262 (see
notes 15 and 16). Arendt’s “thoughtlessness” refers
to episodic moral disengagement, a capable moral
agent turning her attention from moral principles
and reasoning.
The desire to promote a minimal set of moral dispositions and virtues motivates Chambers and Kopstein’s insistence that associational membership
promote the value of reciprocity, and also Rosenblum’s admission that liberal democracy requires
certain moral dispositions including “treating people
identically and with easy spontaneity” and “speaking
out against ordinary injustices.” Chambers and
Kopstein 2001, 839; Rosenblum 1998, 350.
Maimonides 1962, 10:7–12.
This first kind of welfare “leads society to concern
itself with the misfortunes of its members and is
ready systematically to alleviate their sufferings.”
Tocqueville 1997, 51.
Rosenblum 1998, 8–10, 15–17.
Arendt 1994, 287 and 32–3.
Aristotle draws attention to the divergence between
civic and moral virtue in Book 2 of the Politics, with
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his distinction between the morally virtuous good
man and the conventionally dutiful good citizen.
Putnam 2000, 22–3.
Plato 1991, 351c-d.
Tocqueville 2000, 516.
Pocock, “Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers,” in Hont and Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and
Virtue (1986), 240 (emphasis added).
As one example among many, see Cohen and Arato,
1992. Tocqueville’s praise for Americans’ “art of
associating” in civil associations has impressed and
influenced several generations of political scientists.
Tocqueville 2000, 489–496. In Tocqueville’s account, those “associations that are formed in civil
life and which have an object that is in no way
political” often promote intellectual and moral
development: “[s]entiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is
developed only by the reciprocal action of men
upon one another.” Tocqueville 2000, 491. When
citizens come together in civil engagement they may
develop a sense of efficacy and interpersonal bonds,
which is why “civil associations thus facilitate political associations.” Contemporary scholars such as
Verba, et al. draw similar conclusions. Cf. Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 79.
Zukin et al. 2006.
To confuse matters even more, one scholar has
recently defined social capital as a measure of “civic
group involvement, social and racial trust, and political engagement,” thus making social capital dependent upon civic and political engagement instead of
the other way around. Brooks 2005.
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 173, 113.
Putnam’s website for the “Saguaro Seminar” at Harvard University, subtitled “Civic Engagement in
America,” links civic engagement with various “quality of life” benefits, including longer life spans.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro
Norris 2005; f http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_
turnout_pop2.cfm.
In particular, citizens at the lower end of the income
and educational spectrums have tended to vote at
lower than average rates and, when inactive, to have
their interests less well represented by self-styled
advocates than citizens at higher ends of those spectrums. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse show ample empirical
evidence that many Americans dislike political
engagement, and that increased exposure to political
deliberation or a diverse range of citizens may actually increase their animosity. Hibbing and TheissMorse 2002, 1, 130–1, 183–208. They also
question whether what I have called “civil engagement” actually improves political engagement and

effectiveness: “Regardless of how much the theorists
muse and yearn, the empirical evidence consistently indicates that involvement either in volunteer
groups or in rich, real deliberative settings does
nothing to help people appreciate and deal successfully with the challenges of democratic governance.” Ibid., 209.
94 By “legal coercion,” I mean the kind of policies that compel desired responses, whether in the form of action
or inaction, through the threat of non-draconian penalties. Even political liberals accept legal coercion as
legitimate when they are undertaken to prevent harm
or offense to other people. Cf. Feinberg 1990. If radical political disengagement can be shown to cause
the public interest serious harm, then even political liberals might countenance policies that require political engagement.
95 Cf. Arendt 1961 and 1963. Regardless of whether
Arendt fully believed in her words—that politics is
praiseworthy in and of itself—she is interpreted by
others as a civic republican theorist and cited in
support of politics’ intrinsic value. Cf. Barber 1986,
Sandel 1996.
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